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 An Experimental Study of Price Dispersion
Abstract
Price comparison sites have become an increasingly popular way to shop online. Yet, even
though consumers have complete access to the list of prices for apparently identical products
offered on these sites, persistent price dispersion has been widely observed. One important
theoretical explanation for this phenomenon comes from clearinghouse models of price
dispersion. These models predict that price dispersion arises because of consumer
heterogeneities – some consumers are “informed” and simply buy from the firm offering the
lowest price while the remaining consumers are “captive” and shop based on considerations
other than price. Using a simple clearinghouse model, we derive testable comparative static
implications of changes in market structure on equilibrium pricing. We show that an increase
in the fraction of informed consumers leads to more competitive pricing for all consumers.
Further, we show that when more firms enter the market, prices to informed consumers
become more competitive, but prices to captive customers become less competitive. We then
assess these implications in a laboratory experiment. Despite some discrepancies between
predicted and pricing behavior, we find strong support for the comparative static predictions
derived above.
Keywords: Clearinghouse, Internet, Experiments, Price Dispersion
JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C923
An Experimental Study of Price Dispersion
1. Introduction
One important way in which Internet retail markets differ from their brick and mortar
cousins is in the prevalence of price comparison sites. One of the most popular price
comparison sites is Shopper.com. This site covers over 100,000 different consumer
electronics products. Figure 1 provides a screen shot of the information that a consumer
obtains by accessing this site. At the top of the screen, the manufacturer and part number
being offered are shown; thus consumers can be sure that they are indeed comparing prices
for identical products. Below this, the prices offered by listing merchants are displayed. As
the figure shows, the information on the screen presents the name of each listing merchant,
the price offered, and details as to shipping costs and whether the product is in stock. All of
this information is sortable by the consumer. To purchase an item, the consumer need only
click the merchant’s name, and she is taken to the merchant’s site where the item is located.
2
 [FIGURE 1 HERE]
Of course, a substantial fraction of consumers do not shop using price comparison
sites and, even of those who do, some do not appear to be motivated purely by price
considerations. For instance, Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) offer evidence of click-through
rates at a price comparison site for books. They find that 16% of consumers make multiple
click-throughs when visiting the site and a significant number of consumers make their last
click through, which is presumably reasonably highly correlated with subsequent purchase, to
a seller not offering the lowest price. In a survey, Smith, Bailey, and Brynjolfsson (1999)
identify several factors such as loyalty, brand awareness, trust, and reputational
considerations as possibly motivating some consumers not to purchase from the low-price
                                                       
2 Since merchants pay to list their items at the site and since there is a fee (from 40 to 75 cents) for each “lead”
(in the form of a click through) provided by Shopper.com, there are substantial incentives for merchants not to
misrepresent their information. See Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2001) for additional discussion of the
“seriousness” of price listings on Shopper.com.4
firms. Nonetheless, consumers shopping at comparison sites seem to be unusually price
sensitive. Ellison and Ellison (2001) estimate a demand elasticity of –51.8 for consumers
shopping at a price comparison site for low-end computer memory.
So how competitive are prices listed on comparison sites? In a study of the top 1000
products listed on Shopper.com over a period from August 2, 2000 through March 1, 2001,
Baye, Morgan, and Scholten find that on average a little more than 18 firms list prices for
each product. Despite the number of firms competing in what are essentially homogeneous
product markets, Baye et al. find the there is persistent and substantial price dispersion in
these markets. Likewise, other studies of price comparison sites, such as Brynjolfsson and
Smith (2000), observe substantial price dispersion.
An important equilibrium explanation of the observed price dispersion comes from
“clearinghouse” models. In these models, firms list prices at some central clearinghouse for
price information, such as a price comparison site. Some consumers consult these price
listings and buy from the firm offering the lowest price. Other consumers shop on some other
basis, such as store name recognition, branding, and so on. These consumers are essentially
“captive” customers, distributed among the competing firms. In this environment, firms face
a tension between posting a low price to attract consumers shopping at the comparison site
and posting a high price to extract revenue from captive customers.
3 Equilibria in these
models lead to a distribution of prices offered by firms. That is, these models predict
persistent price dispersion for prices posted in the central clearinghouse. Models along these
lines include Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Shilony (1977), Rosenthal (1980), Varian (1980) and
Baye and Morgan (2001).
                                                       
3 These models assume that a firm can post a single price, and so cannot price discriminate between the two
types of consumer. Interestingly, at least for firms listing prices on Shopper.com, Baye et al. report finding little
evidence of price discrimination.5
In Section 2, we study a simple clearinghouse model and derive comparative static
implications of changes in market structure on equilibrium pricing. In particular, as the
proportion of informed buyers increases, the prices paid by both informed buyers and captive
customers are predicted to decrease. That is, the market gets more competitive. In contrast, as
the number of competing sellers increases, the price paid by informed buyers declines, but
that paid by captive customers increases. Thus, the model delivers the counterintuitive
prediction that increased competition in fact raises prices to a portion of the consumers.
These theoretical findings potentially have important implications for government
policies related to promoting the Internet. In particular, policies designed to bridge the
“digital divide” by providing universal Internet access are pro-competitive since they
presumably increase the fraction of “informed” consumers. Moreover, this policy creates a
positive externality, lowering the prices paid by customers still on the wrong side of the
divide. On the other hand, issues such as tax exemption for Internet transactions, which may
have the effect of spurring entry into E-commerce, need not be socially beneficial. Although
such initiatives are predicted to lead to lower prices for informed consumers, the remaining
consumers might actually be hurt by this policy in the form of higher prices.
So how seriously should one take these theoretical implications? To date,
clearinghouse models have received little empirical investigation. Villas-Boas (1995) directly
tests Varian’s model using data from the coffee and saltine cracker markets. He finds that the
marginal distributions of prices in some markets are indeed consistent with that predicted by
the model. However, estimates of structural cost parameters vary widely across similar
products, raising some questions about the empirical validity of the model. More recently
Kessner and Polborn (2000) use the effects of changes in tax policy on prices in the German
life insurance industry to test whether price dispersion is best explained by imperfect
consumer information or product heterogeneity. They conclude that at least part of the6
observed price dispersion cannot be explained by product heterogeneity, but rather is a
consequence of imperfect consumer information.
The paucity of empirical studies in this area may reflect the difficulties of assessing
these models using field data. Laboratory methods, on the other hand, are ideally suited to
assessing these models, since they offer an opportunity to control two sets of relevant
variables.
First, the equilibrium pricing strategies depend on the fraction of consumers using the
comparison site to shop, the reservation prices of the consumers, the cost structures of the
competing firms, and the number of potential competitors. In an experiment, these variables
can be controlled and manipulated, whereas these variables are often difficult to observe and
measure in the field.
Second, field data will typically reflect several sources of price dispersion. For
example, merchants listing prices on Shopper.com differ slightly in their arrangements for
restocking in the event of a return, in customer service, in their general reputation for
reliability, in their inventory costs, and on a host of other factors. While such product
heterogeneity is clearly important in field settings, the clearinghouse models suggest it is not
necessary to generate equilibrium price dispersion.
4 In laboratory experiments we are able to
focus on how changes in consumer search technologies affect price dispersion, and minimize
such confounding factors as product heterogeneity.
In Section 3, we describe an experiment designed to test the clearinghouse model
predictions. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to assess the plausibility and
implications of these models experimentally. As noted, of particular interest is the effect of
variation in the competitive structure of the market on price levels. We consider two types of
                                                       
4 As Stigler (1961, p. 214) points out there is never absolute homogeneity of commodities in naturally occurring
markets. However, he regards price dispersion as primarily reflecting ignorance in the market; he states "…a
portion of the observed dispersion is presumably attributable to such [product] differences. But it would be
metaphysical, and fruitless, to assert that all dispersion is due to heterogeneity."7
variation: First, we vary the number of competing sellers in the market—in one treatment
using two sellers and in another treatment using four sellers. Second, we vary the proportion
of “informed” buyers—in one treatment using equal numbers of informed and captive buyers,
and in another treatment using five informed buyers per captive buyer.
Section 4 presents our results. In all treatments, we observe, as predicted, persistent
price dispersion and pricing above marginal cost by sellers, and we find strong support for the
comparative static predictions of the model. When the proportion of informed buyers
increases, prices to all buyers fall. In particular, prices to informed buyers decline by 46% in
the Two-seller treatment and by 51% in the Four-seller treatment, while prices to captive
customers decline by 35% and 20%, respectively. When the number of sellers increases from
two to four, prices to informed buyers fall while those paid by captive consumers increase. In
particular, prices to informed buyers decline by 36% (when there are equal numbers of
informed and captive buyers) and 42% (when five in six buyers are informed), while prices to
captive customers increase by 7% and 31%, respectively. Thus, in terms of predicting the
direction in which prices move in response to underlying changes in the market structure, the
model performs extremely well.
However, we do find some systematic discrepancies between theoretical and observed
price distributions. In the two seller treatments, observed average prices are consistently
higher than that predicted by theory. In the four seller treatments, prices tended to be more
dispersed than the theory predicts. Section 5 explores possible explanations for these
discrepancies. Finally, Section 6 concludes.8
2. Theory
2.1 A Simple Clearinghouse Model
Consider a market where n identical firms compete to supply some product. Each firm has a
constant marginal cost, which we normalize to be zero and no fixed costs or capacity
constraints. Firms simultaneously choose prices. Let pi be the price chosen by firm i.
Demand in this market comes from a continuum of consumers normalized to mass
equaling one, who each demand one unit at any price not exceeding a reservation price of r.
We also normalize r to be 1. A fraction, l, of consumers freely obtain access to the full list of
prices offered by firms. These consumers buy from the firm offering the lowest price,
provided this price does not exceed the reservation price. The remaining customers, whom
we call captive customers, are evenly distributed among the competing firms and purchase if
the firm to which they are “loyal” offers a price less than the reservation price. Thus, a firm
can expect to sell to (1-l)/n captive customers as long as its price does not exceed 1.
5
Firms choose prices to maximize expected profits. Let p-i denote the set { p1, p2, …,
pi-1, pi+1,…, pn}. Thus, the expected profit of firm i when it chooses price p is
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This model is closely related to Varian (1980). The main differences are that we fix
the number of competing firms exogenously, enabling direct comparative static analysis with
respect to the number of competing firms. (Varian determines the number of competing firms
                                                       
5 A variety of interpretations may be given to the behavior of captive consumers. For instance, they may not
have access to or be aware of the price comparison site. Alternatively, they may have access to the site, but be
primarily motivated by considerations other than price, such as branding or reputation.9
according to a zero profit condition.) We also assume constant marginal costs (which we
normalize at zero) and no fixed costs.
6
A symmetric equilibrium involves mixed strategies where each firm prices according
to a continuous cumulative distribution F on the interval [p0, 1]. Expected profits for all
prices in the support of F must be
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In summary,
Proposition 1. A symmetric equilibrium in the model entails all firms pricing according to
the cumulative distribution
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Proof. See Appendix A.
                                                       
6 This cost structure seems roughly consistent with that faced by e-retailers who have, essentially, a constant
marginal cost per unit sold. Of course, fixed costs are a significant expense for e-retailers as well. Nonetheless,
since in equilibrium firms earn positive economic profits, our results are robust to the inclusion of positive fixed
costs.10
In studying this model in a laboratory setting, we will mainly be interested in
comparative statics relating to the competitiveness of prices; that is, the expected prices paid
by informed and captive consumers. Recall that the expected price paid by informed
consumers is the expectation of the lowest price offered by the n competing firms. We denote
this by E(pmin). In contrast, the expected price paid by captive consumers is simply the
expected value of a single draw from F, or E(p). We focus on how these vary in response to
changes in the proportion of informed consumers, l, and the number of firms, n.
2.2 Changes in the Proportion of Informed Consumers
As access to the Internet becomes increasingly widespread, we would expect that the
proportion of informed consumers as a fraction of the population would be increasing. What
impact does this have on prices for those consumers on both sides of the digital divide? We
show that an increase in the fraction of informed consumers lowers prices to both informed
and captive consumers. Formally,
Proposition 2. As the fraction of informed consumers increases, the expected prices paid by
both informed and captive consumers decrease.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To obtain some intuition for this result, notice that, as the fraction of informed
consumers increases, price reductions to attract these customers become relatively more
attractive to firms. At the same time, the reduction in the fraction of captive customers
available to each firm means that the cost of these price reductions, in terms of foregone
revenues from captive customers, is now lower. The upshot is that each firm’s distribution of
prices when a smaller fraction of consumers are informed stochastically dominates the price
distribution when a larger fraction is informed.11
2.3 Changes in the Number of Competing Firms
Over the last several years, the number of e-retailers has grown exponentially. What is the
impact of this growth on pricing for both informed and captive consumers? In this subsection,
we show that while this growth in the number of competing firms is helpful to informed
consumers, the model predicts that it is harmful to captive consumers. In other words, while
increases in the number of competing firms lower the expected price to informed consumers,
the expected price paid by captive consumers increases.
To see this, we first show that E(pmin) and E(p) move in opposite directions with
respect to n. In particular (see Appendix A),
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This differs from a result in Rosenthal (1980). Rosenthal shows that the expected price paid
by both informed and captive consumers move in the same (increasing) direction as a
function of the number of competing firms. A key difference between the two models is that,
in Rosenthal, an increase in the number of firms is accompanied by an increase in the number
of captive consumers so that each firm retains a constant number of captive consumers. As a
result, the stiffer competition for the informed consumers makes offering discounted prices in
hopes of attracting them, less attractive relative to simply capturing the surplus from the
captive consumers. This drives up the expected prices to both types of consumers.
In our model, entry leads to a reduction in each firm’s share of the captive consumers
and to stiffer competition for informed consumers. Thus, firms are being tugged in opposite
directions. Catering solely to the captive consumers is a less profitable strategy with a larger
number of firms. At the same time, competition for informed consumers grows stiffer with
firm entry, so it too is a less attractive market.12
We show in Appendix A that E(p) increases with n. This combined with the
observation that prices move in opposite directions for informed and uninformed consumers
demonstrates
Proposition 3. As the number of firms increases, the expected price paid by informed
consumers decreases and the expected price paid by captive consumers increases.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3. Experiment
In this Section, we describe in detail the procedures and parameters used in the experimental
sessions.
3.1 Parameters
The model described in the previous section delivers clear comparative static predictions for
the effects of changes in the market structure (i.e. changes in n or l) on prices to informed
buyers and prices to captive consumers. We test these predictions by varying the number of
sellers at two and four, and the proportion of informed buyers at 1/2 and 5/6 of the
population. Table 1 presents theoretical predictions of the prices to informed and captive
consumers under our experimental conditions as well as under some alternative parameter
configurations.
Table 1. Theoretical Predictions for Alternative Parameter Values
l = 0/6 l = 1/6 l = 2/6 l = 3/6 l = 4/6 l = 5/6 l = 6/6
n = 2 1 0.841 0.693 0.549 0.402 0.240 0 E(p)
n = 4 1 0.859 0.748 0.648 0.545 0.421 0
n = 2 1 0.794 0.614 0.451 0.299 0.152 0 E(pmin)
n = 4 1 0.703 0.504 0.352 0.228 0.116 013
We consider the situation where there are two competing sellers and where half the
buyers are informed to be a natural benchmark treatment. As Table 1 shows, relative to this
benchmark, doubling the number of sellers is predicted to increase the mean price paid by
captive customers by 18% and decrease that paid by informed buyers by 22%. Increasing the
fraction of informed buyers to 5/6 lowers the expected price they pay (relative to the
benchmark) by 66% while also lowering the price paid by captive customers by 56%.
As we report below, with the parameters n = 2, 4, and l = 1/2, 5/6, our experimental
design effectively separates treatments in the sense that if the theoretical model correctly
describes pricing behavior, the comparative static tests that we employ lead to correct
inferences with probabilities close to one.
The main advantages of our chosen parameterization over the other alternatives we
considered are as follows:
1. If the fraction of informed consumers is too low, detecting the effect of changes in the
number of sellers on price levels becomes increasingly difficult. For instance, when
the fraction is only 1/6, doubling the number of sellers from 2 to 4 results in virtually
no change in the average price paid by informed and captive consumers. Similarly, at
both extremes – where all consumers are informed or none are – changing the number
of sellers is predicted to have no effect whatsoever.
2. Relative to the benchmark, doubling the number of sellers ensures a large enough
predicted effect to be at least in principle observable in the data.
3.2 Procedures
The experiment consisted of 12 sessions conducted at the University of Nottingham in Spring
2001. Six sessions employed a Two-seller treatment, while the other six employed a Four-14
seller treatment. The differences between these treatments are indicated below, otherwise all
sessions used identical procedures.
7
Subjects were recruited from a distribution list comprised of undergraduate students
from across the entire university who had indicated a willingness to be paid volunteers in
decision-making experiments, where participants earn on average between £6 and £12 per
hour, depending on the experiment. For this experiment subjects were sent an e-mail
invitation promising to participate in a session lasting approximately 90 minutes, for which
they would receive a £3 show-up fee plus “an additional amount that would depend on
decisions made during a session.”
8
Twelve subjects participated in each session, and no subject appeared in more than
one session. Throughout the session, no communication between subjects was permitted, and
all choices and information were transmitted via computer terminals. At the beginning of a
session, the subjects were seated at computer terminals and given a set of instructions, which
were then read aloud by the experimenter.
9
The session then consisted of three phases of thirty periods each. At the beginning of
each period, subjects were randomly assigned to groups of either two (Two-seller sessions) or
four (Four-seller sessions) sellers, and then simultaneously chose prices from the set {0, 1, 2,
…, 100}.
10 Each group faced six computerized buyers who bought twelve units each. Some
of these buyers corresponded to the informed buyers of Section 2 and were programmed to
buy all twelve units from whichever seller charged the lowest price. (In the case of ties for the
lowest price, purchases were divided equally among the tied sellers.) The remaining buyers
                                                       
7 We also conducted two pilot sessions using graduate students - these are reported in Appendix B.
8 At the time of the experiment the exchange rate was approximately £1 = $1.42.
9 Appendix C contains copies of the instructions.
10 Notice that one way in which the experimental implementation of the clearinghouse model differs from theory
is that subjects choose from a discrete rather than a continuous set of prices. For our benchmark treatment, we
computed the exact symmetric equilibrium for the  discrete case. The difference between this equilibrium and
that predicted when the choice set is continuous is negligible: for example, the expected price is about half a
percent higher in the discrete case.15
corresponded to the captive buyers, and bought six units (Two-seller) or three units (Four-
seller) from each seller. After all subjects had submitted their prices, profits for each seller,
denominated in ‘points’, were calculated as (price · quantity). At the end of each period a
‘Results Screen’ was displayed on each terminal. This screen listed all prices submitted in the
period, together with the associated quantities, highlighting the prices and quantities for that
subject’s competitor(s). The screen also informed subjects of their own point earnings for that
period, the previous five periods, as well as accumulated point earnings. A sample ‘Results
Screen’ is shown in Figure 2.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
In the first phase of thirty periods, groups faced three informed and three captive
buyers. In the second phase (periods 31-60) the proportion of informed buyers was increased
to five of six, and in the third phase (periods 61-90) the proportion was decreased back to
three of six. This information was described in the instructions, and was also given on the
screen that prompted subjects for their pricing decision.
At the end of the session, subjects were paid the show-up fee plus 1p per 100 points
accumulated over all ninety periods. Earnings averaged £17.96 (Two-seller sessions) and
£9.33 (Four-seller sessions) for sessions lasting between 50 and 80 minutes. At the end of the
session, subjects also completed a short post-experimental questionnaire and the question
“Would you be willing to take part in other experiments of this sort?” received 144 out of 144
affirmative responses.
In arriving at these procedures, we considered a number of issues regarding the
number of periods and the nature of the feedback, the computerized nature of the buyers, and
the way in which subjects were rewarded.
Given the complexity of calculating the equilibrium distribution, we did not expect
strategies to conform to equilibrium predictions at the outset of a session. Rather we16
envisaged that subjects may develop a sense of what were good and bad strategies as they
gained experience with the environment, and received feedback on others’ decisions.
We considered several alternative ways to give feedback to subjects. In an
experimental study of markets with costly search, Abrams, Sefton and Yavas (2000) had
sellers repeatedly post prices over 25 market periods, but did not reveal to sellers the prices
posted by other sellers throughout a session. (Sellers did however get some feedback in the
form of buyers’ responses to their price decisions.) In their experiment, prices deviated
significantly from predicted levels, even in later periods. In contrast, in another experiment
on costly buyer search, Cason and Friedman (2000) found much stronger support for
theoretical mixed strategy predictions. In their setup, at the end of each period a seller
received information about the entire distribution of prices. Since we find it plausible that
part of the difference in results from the two studies reflects differences in feedback
opportunities, and since we wanted to give the theoretical model its ‘best shot’, we adopted
the Cason and Friedman procedure. Thus, we had subjects repeatedly post prices over ninety
periods (as many as were feasible in a ninety-minute session), and, at the end of each period,
informed subjects of all prices posted.
Our use of computerized buyers also mimics one of Cason and Friedman’s
procedures. In Abrams et al., price predictions yielded an extremely inequitable distribution
of the gains from trade. In their ‘Bertrand’ treatment, prices were predicted to give all the
gains from trade to buyers, while in their ‘Monopoly’ treatment prices were predicted to give
all gains from trade to sellers. In fact, observed prices resulted in a more equitable
distribution, and in the monopoly treatment especially, human buyers appeared to resist high
prices, often rejecting profitable transactions. Thus distributional concerns appear to have
complicated the strategic issues in the Abrams et al. experiment. Cason and Friedman’s use
of robot buyers in some of their treatments effectively eliminated these distributional17
concerns. An additional advantage of adopting their procedure was that it simplified
considerably the instructions and environment faced by subjects.
One drawback of this design is that it could, in principle, introduce unintended
repeated game effects. For example, subjects may coordinate on collusive strategies whereby
they all charge the monopoly price, and punish defectors by reverting to low prices. In order
to mitigate such factors, we anonymously and randomly matched subjects throughout the
session and prevented communication among subjects. These design factors make it
extremely difficult to implement strategies designed to “punish” a particular player for past
transgressions. As we report in the next section, aggregate behavior seems broadly consistent
with many of the predictions of the static model but inconsistent with monopoly pricing with
occasional “punishment” intervals.
We also noted that the theoretical price distribution is derived under the assumption of
risk neutrality. One approach to dealing with the possibility that subjects are risk-averse is to
employ a binary lottery procedure to induce (theoretically) risk neutral preferences. The
drawback of this procedure is that it requires more complicated instructions and places higher
cognitive demands on subjects. In fact, Selten, Sadrieh, and Abbink (1999) find subjects’
decisions are less consistent with expected value maximization when the procedure is used
than when subjects are paid directly in cash. For this reason we decided against using the
binary lottery procedure, preferring instead to keep the experimental environment as simple
as possible. We return to the issue of risk aversion in Section 5 of the paper.
3.3 Hypotheses
The design of our sessions allows formal tests of the comparative static predictions presented
in Section 2. In all cases these are non-parametric tests applied to session-level data. Our null18
hypotheses state that changes in the market structure (i.e. in n or l) have no impact on prices,
and we test these against one-sided alternative hypotheses suggested by the model.
For testing the prediction that increasing the number of sellers raises the expected
price paid by a captive consumer, we first average prices over the first phase of each session,
and then compare the set of six averages from Two-seller sessions with that from Four-seller
sessions using a one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We then repeat these tests for the other
two phases.
For testing the prediction that increasing the proportion of informed sellers lowers
expected prices, we consider the change in average price between phases one and two for
each Two-seller session, and employ a binomial test. Under the null hypothesis that prices are
determined in the same way in the two phases, we would expect the average price to be
equally likely to rise or fall. We reject the hypothesis if average prices fall in sufficiently
many sessions. Similarly, we consider tests based on changes between phases two and three,
and between phases one and three. (In the latter case, the model predicts no difference
between phases, and so we employ a two-sided test). We then repeat all these tests for the
Four-seller sessions.
Tests concerning effects on the expected minimum price, the price paid by informed
buyers, are conducted in a similar way, using a single estimate of the mean minimum price
for each phase of each session. To compute this, we first estimate the expected minimum
price in a single period. Rather than use the average of the observed minimum prices, which
depends on the ex post matching of subjects into groups of competitors, we compute the
average over all possible matchings. This gives an estimate for each period, and we then
average these estimates over all thirty periods to get a single estimate of expected minimum
price for that phase of the session.
In addition to testing these price predictions, we used analogous methods to examine19
the comparative static predictions of the model for one commonly used empirical measure of
price dispersion, the coefficient of variation (see Carlson and Pescatrice, 1980), hereafter
referred to as ‘CV’. Again, we obtain a single measure of price dispersion for each phase of
each session, by averaging the CVs from separate periods, and apply Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests to these session-level data.
The advantage of this approach to analyzing the data is that it does not rely on any
assumptions about the underlying data generation process within a session. We expect
subjects to learn as they make decisions repeatedly, and we expect subjects to react to other
subjects’ decisions. Thus, while we have many observations per session, these observations
should not be viewed as independent. On the other hand, we regard any summary statistic
constructed from a single session to be independent from those constructed from other
sessions. Thus, our approach yields exact tests without imposing strong assumptions about
how subject choices are related to one another.
The disadvantage of this approach is that the tests are based on relatively few
observations - for example the test of whether reducing the number of informed buyers
reduces the expected price when there are two sellers is based on just six observations.
Nevertheless, we used simulations to investigate the power of the tests when prices are
generated according to the theoretical model. In all cases, the power of the test is extremely
close to one. Thus, our design delivers high probabilities of rejecting the null hypotheses
when the theoretical model is correct.
4. Results
Recall that the average price paid by captive customers should, in theory, increase with the
number of sellers, and decrease with the proportion of informed buyers. Figure 3 displays20
five-period moving averages of prices in the Two- and Four-seller treatments, together with
the theoretical predictions.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
Comparing these averages across the three phases, we observe clear shifts in the
predicted directions. Prices tend to be higher in the Four-seller sessions, and tend to be lower
in phase two than the other phases. Formal tests are based on the average prices within a
phase of a session, as tabulated in Table 2.
Table 2. Average Prices
Two-seller sessions Four-seller sessions
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Phase
p-val
1 59.57 55.36 60.72 63.54 58.02 63.04 63.81 58.83 64.45 68.84 70.59 62.03 0.032
2 42.05 30.19 43.18 41.24 44.93 36.21 49.02 45.87 54.04 58.36 52.38 51.59 0.001
3 61.75 61.13 63.62 59.49 60.14 60.11 66.86 64.14 64.01 63.84 66.21 64.00 0.001
In fact, for all three phases the null hypothesis of no comparative static effect can be
rejected at conventional significance levels on the basis of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The p-
value indicates the probability under the null hypothesis of obtaining a sum of ranks at least
as large as that observed (where a rank of 1 is assigned to the session yielding the lowest
average price and the sum is based on the ranks of the Four-seller sessions).
Next, we test whether varying the proportion of informed buyers has the predicted
effect. Our tests are based on the changes in average prices between phases, as tabulated in
Table 3.21
Table 3. Change in Average Prices between Phases
Two-seller sessions Four-seller sessions
Phase 2 - 1 Phase 3 - 2 Phase 3 - 1 Phase 2 - 1 Phase 3 - 2 Phase 3 - 1
Session
1 -17.52 19.70 2.18 -14.79 17.84 3.05
2 -25.17 30.94 5.77 -12.96 18.27 5.31
3 -17.54 20.44 2.90 -10.41 9.97 -0.44
4 -22.30 18.25 -4.05 -10.48 5.48 -5.00
5 -13.09 15.21 2.12 -18.21 13.83 -4.38
6 -26.83 23.90 -2.93 -10.44 12.41 1.97
p-value 0.016 0.016 0.688 0.016 0.016 1.000
Consider the first column. This lists the changes in average prices between phases one
and two for each Two-seller session. A binomial test easily rejects the null hypothesis that
average prices are equally likely to rise or fall in favor of the alternative (suggested by the
theoretical model) that average prices are more likely to fall. (The probability of observing
six negative signs, under the null hypothesis is 0.016.) Similarly, the changes between phases
two and three support the prediction of the theoretical model. Likewise, the data from the
Four-seller sessions support the theoretical predictions. Thus, in all cases, expected prices
change with the proportion of informed buyers in the direction predicted by the model.
Next, we turn to the expected price paid by informed buyers, the expected minimum
price. This is predicted to be higher in the Two- than Four-seller treatment, and to be lower in
phase two than the other phases. Figure 4 displays 5-period moving averages of the estimated
expected minimum price for the Two- and Four-seller sessions. As with the average price, the
data appear to move in the directions predicted by the model.
[FIGURE 4 HERE]
 Consider first the effect of the number of sellers. As before, we use one-sided
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests applied to session-level data. Table 4 lists the estimated expected
minimum price for each phase of each session. For all three phases, the tests applied to these
data reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect.22
Table 4. Average Minimum Prices
Two-seller sessions Four-seller sessions
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Phase
p-val
1 48.12 44.90 48.04 52.41 44.89 52.68 28.04 28.49 31.29 33.08 37.59 30.05 0.001
2 28.15 18.76 30.30 25.84 31.39 24.79 13.96 11.25 18.34 18.65 14.58 16.27 0.001
3 49.68 50.77 50.93 48.76 49.62 50.10 33.74 30.61 31.64 31.16 33.04 30.58 0.001
To formally test the comparative static prediction concerning l, we look at changes in
the estimates from phase to phase (Table 5). For both the n = 2 and n = 4 parameterizations,
we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the theoretically predicted effect that l and the
expected minimum price move in opposite directions.
Table 5. Change in Average Minimum Prices between Phases
Two-seller sessions Four-seller sessions
Phase 2 - 1 Phase 3 - 2 Phase 3 - 1 Phase 2 - 1 Phase 3 - 2 Phase 3 - 1
Session
1 -19.97 21.53 1.56 -14.08 19.78 5.70
2 -26.14 32.01 5.87 -17.24 19.36 2.12
3 -17.74 20.63 2.89 -12.95 13.30 0.35
4 -26.57 22.92 -3.65 -14.43 12.51 -1.92
5 -13.50 18.23 4.73 -23.01 18.46 -4.55
6 -27.89 25.31 -2.58 -13.78 14.31 0.53
p-value 0.016 0.016 0.688 0.016 0.016 0.688
A commonly used measure of price dispersion in empirical studies is the coefficient
of variation. It is straightforward to calculate theoretical predictions for our parameter values
(see Appendix A). For our parameters, the predicted values for the Two-seller treatment are
32.5% (phases one and three) and 76.0% (phase two). The predicted values for the Four-
seller treatment are 43.3% (phases one and three) and 82.0% (phase two). Thus for both Two-
and Four- seller treatments the model predicts a large increase in price dispersion as l, the
proportion of informed buyers, increases from 1/2 to 5/6. For these values of l, the model
also predicts a somewhat milder increase in price dispersion as the number of sellers doubles
from 2 to 4.23
To estimate the CV from our data we calculate a CV for each period by dividing the
sample standard deviation of the twelve prices by their average, and then, for each phase of
each session, we take the average coefficient over the thirty periods. The estimates are listed
in Table 6, and the changes in these estimates across phases are listed in Table 7.
Table 6. Price Dispersion
Two-seller sessions Four-seller sessions
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Phase
p-val
1 .356 .351 .377 .325 .407 .301 .553 .545 .525 .501 .435 .513 0.001
2 .646 .744 .579 .726 .613 .593 .850 .850 .748 .693 .775 .777 0.004
3 .345 .310 .363 .336 .311 .306 .489 .513 .488 .512 .473 .521 0.001
Table 7. Change in Price Dispersion between Phases
Two-seller sessions Four-seller sessions
Phase 2 - 1 Phase 3 - 2 Phase 3 - 1 Phase 2 - 1 Phase 3 - 2 Phase 3 - 1
Session
1 0.290 -0.301 -0.011 0.297 -0.361 -0.064
2 0.393 -0.434 -0.041 0.305 -0.337 -0.032
3 0.202 -0.216 -0.014 0.223 -0.260 -0.037
4 0.401 -0.39 0.011 0.192 -0.181 0.011
5 0.206 -0.302 -0.096 0.340 -0.302 0.038
6 0.292 -0.287 0.005 0.264 -0.256 0.008
p-value 0.016 0.016 0.688 0.016 0.016 1.000
Once again, the model’s comparative static predictions are supported by our data.
Across our treatments, the observed effects are statistically significant: price dispersion
increases with the proportion of informed buyers, and with the number of sellers.
In summary, the theory makes clear predictions about the directions in which
expected prices, expected minimum prices, and coefficients of variation should move in
response to changes in our parameters. In all cases, our data support these comparative static
predictions.
There are, however, discrepancies between theoretical and observed price
distributions under each treatment. Figures 5-8 display the theoretical and empirical24
cumulative distribution functions for our four treatments (pooling all data from sessions with
a given treatment).
[FIGURES 5-8 HERE]
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the theoretical and empirical cumulative distributions in the
Two-seller treatments. As the figures show, there is close to a stochastic dominance
relationship between the empirical and theoretical distributions of prices. As a result, both the
mean and median prices are higher in the empirical distribution than is predicted by the
theory. (This pattern also holds for each session taken separately: inspection of Tables 1 and
2 show that the average price exceeds the theoretical mean in every phase of every session)
Interestingly, the lower support of the empirical distribution is close to the theoretical
prediction in Two-seller treatments. When the fraction of informed is one-half, fewer than
5% of price observations are below the theoretical lower support. When the fraction of
informed consumers is 5/6ths, almost no prices occur below the theoretical lower support.
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the theoretical and empirical cumulative distributions in the
Four-seller treatments. The pattern of behavior in the Four-seller treatment differs from the
Two-seller treatment in that there is no stochastic dominance relationship between the
empirical and theoretical distributions. Indeed, when the fraction of informed consumers is
one-half, the empirical distribution is approximately a mean-preserving spread of the
theoretical distribution. In this case, the mean and median outcomes of the empirical
distribution are quite close to their theoretical counterparts, but the variance of the empirical
distribution is higher than that predicted by theory. (Again, this pattern holds in all sessions:
see Table 6.) When 5/6ths of consumers are informed, the mean and median of the empirical
distribution are higher than their theoretical counterparts. Unlike the Two-seller sessions, a
higher fraction of prices lie below the theoretical lower support of the distribution. In the25
Four-seller sessions, about 10% of price observations lie below the lower support of the
theoretical distribution, compared with less than 5% for the Two-seller sessions.
An obvious question is whether these discrepancies are stable or decreasing over time.
As we saw in Tables 3, 5, and 7, there was no significant change in average price, average
minimum price, or the level of price dispersion from phase 1 to phase 3. Thus, there is little
evidence that price distributions are converging to theoretical predictions.
11
To summarize, while the comparative static predictions of the model are borne out by
the data, the theoretical distribution is clearly not an exact description of behavior in our
laboratory environment. Average prices are systematically higher than predicted in our Two-
seller sessions, and in phase two of our Four-seller sessions. In phases one and three of our
Four-seller sessions, average prices are close to the theoretical mean, but there is excessive
price dispersion. Moreover, these discrepancies do not erode over the course of a session.
5. Discussion
In this Section, we explore two potential explanations for the discrepancy between the
theoretical and empirical cumulative distributions of prices: risk aversion and bounded
rationality in the form of a small fraction of “irrational” sellers. As we shall see, neither of
these is very successful in reconciling the theory to the observed pricing behavior.
Our theoretical predictions are derived under the assumption that firms are risk-
neutral. If subjects are risk averse, prices may deviate from the risk-neutral prediction,
depending on how such risk attitudes are modeled. For example, it is straightforward to show
that if all firms have identical risk-averse utility functions, the equilibrium distribution of
                                                       
11 We performed a similar test dividing Phase 2 into two halves and obtained similar results.26
prices will stochastically dominate that derived under the assumption of risk-neutrality.
12
While this might explain the differences between the empirical and theoretical distributions in
Figures 5 and 6, it is substantially at odds with Figure 7, where the empirical distribution
actually crosses the theoretical at a price near the median. Put differently, if risk-aversion
were a complete explanation, it would imply higher prices in the Four-seller sessions. In fact,
average prices are very close to that predicted in that case.
A second explanation is based on the discussion in Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000).
They conducted experiments on Bertrand competition and found prices higher than predicted
in three- and four-seller treatments, but not in two-seller treatments. They suggest an
explanation based on ‘noise traders’. If a small proportion of subjects choose higher prices
than predicted, remaining subjects should also price higher than predicted. Once again, a key
difficulty for this explanation is that it fails to account for the Four-seller sessions when
l=1/2. There, prices are more dispersed, but not higher, than theoretically predicted.
Thus, some questions remain unanswered. In a recent paper, Roth (1996) discusses
the interpretation of theory and experiment in the context of individual choice experiments.
He argues that expected utility theory may be useful despite extensive evidence of anomalous
behavior in experimental settings. He bases his argument on the view that theory may deliver
useful approximations to observed behavior. This view can be easily extended to our strategic
environment. At the outset we asked whether theory could successfully predict the direction
in which market prices move in response to changes in market structure. To the extent that it
does so, we regard our data as evidence of the usefulness of the theoretical model.
                                                       
12 Note that risk aversion does not affect the support of the equilibrium distribution. Let p be given, and scale
utility function u( ) so that u(p(1-l)/n) = 0, and u((1-l)/n) = 1. Let u denote u(p(l+(1-l)/n)). Scale a more risk-
averse utility function v( ) in the same way, so that v = v(p(l+(1-l)/n)) < u. The equilibrium distributions satisfy
(1-Fu(p))
n-1 u = (1-Fv(p))
n-1 v, and since v < u we have Fu(p) > Fv(p) for all p ˛ (p0, 1).27
6. Conclusion
Price comparison sites on the Internet have dramatically reduced the marginal cost of search
for consumers seeking to buy products ranging from motherboards to Mother Goose.
Empirical analysis of these markets shows that price dispersion is substantial and ubiquitous
despite elasticity estimates suggesting that consumers tend to be quite price sensitive. One
explanation for this persistent price dispersion is offered by clearinghouse models.
In this paper, we developed a simple clearinghouse model with clear comparative
static implications, and used laboratory experiments to test these implications. Overall, we
find strong support for the ability of clearinghouse models to predict the comparative static
effects of changes in market structures.
In our experiments, we automated the demand behavior of two groups of consumers:
‘informed’ consumers who know the entire distribution of prices and buy at the lowest price
on offer, and captive consumers who buy based on considerations other than price. When we
increased the proportion of informed consumers, prices paid by both informed and captive
customers decreased, as predicted. Likewise, when we increased the number of competing
sellers, prices paid by informed consumers decreased, but the prices paid by captive
consumers increased, again as predicted by the clearinghouse model.
The implications of changes in market structure we demonstrate have public policy
implications. For example, consider the welfare consequences of alternative pro-Internet
initiatives.
13  Initiatives to spur entry into e-commerce, such as sales tax exemption on
Internet purchases, may have the perverse effect of disadvantaging individuals with limited
Internet access and little chance to avail themselves of price comparison services. In contrast,
the benefits from policies that subsidize high-speed connections in schools, rural areas, and in
                                                       
13 Some of these initiatives aim to reduce the digital divide, which refers to the idea that “information-poor”
individuals - often low-income or poorly-educated – have limited access to information technology, while
“information-rich” individuals - often high-income or well-educated – have much better access.28
poorer neighborhoods, may be understated. Direct beneficiaries of these policies are
individuals who get better access to price comparison services. At the same time, by
increasing the proportion of “Internet-savvy” consumers, these policies encourage price
competition among competing sellers, so that other consumers with good Internet access also
benefit. Moreover, our results show that even those consumers who remain on the wrong side
of the digital divide benefit from the positive externality on prices exerted by the growing
fraction of “wired” consumers.
More broadly, our results have some general implications for understanding the
effects of price competition. The word “competition” is ubiquitous in discussion of economic
and current affairs, but its precise meaning is sometimes unclear. Often a competitive market
is taken to be one with many firms; indeed various concentration indices are used as
measures of competitiveness. Our results show that increased competition in this sense does
not necessarily result in lower prices. An alternative view of competition is based on
consumers’ ability to substitute away from high-priced firms. Our results suggest that
increased competition in this sense does lead to lower prices.
Of course, our model and laboratory environments are simple, and abstract from many
potentially important real-world features; thus these policy implications are merely
suggestive. Further, the theoretical model does not exactly map to behavior in the laboratory.
Specifically, we observe differences in the theoretical and empirical distribution of prices
even though the predicted comparative static implications of the theory hold. Thus, further
research on extensions of the model and subsequent empirical study seems warranted.29
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Figure 4. Average Minimum Prices
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Figure 5. Theoretical and Empirical Cumulative Distributions
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Figure 6. Theoretical and Empirical Cumulative Distributions
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Figure 7. Theoretical and Empirical Cumulative Distributions
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Figure 8. Theoretical and Empirical Cumulative Distributions
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 1. A symmetric equilibrium in the model entails all firms pricing according to
the cumulative distribution 
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Proof: Deviating to a price lower than p0 is not beneficial since pricing at p0 generates a
profit of p0(l + (1-l)/n), while pricing below this level nets no additional customers and so
yields a lower profit. It is obvious that pricing above 1 is not a profitable deviation. Finally,
since F(1) = 1, F(p0) = 0, and F(p) is increasing in p, F is a well-defined cdf.
Proposition 2. As the fraction of informed consumers increases, the expected price paid by
both informed and captive consumers decreases.
Proof. Differentiating the equilibrium distribution with respect to l gives
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Thus, the equilibrium distribution with smaller l stochastically dominates that for larger l.
As a result the expected price and the expected minimum price must both decrease as l
increases.
Proposition 3. As the number of firms increases, the expected price paid by informed
consumers decreases and the expected price paid by captive consumers increases.
Proof. The industry expected profit is
l E(pmin) + ( 1 - l) E(p) = 1 - l36
where the right-hand side follows from the fact that all firms are indifferent between any
equilibrium price and the monopoly price. Differentiating with respect to n, we obtain
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Thus, the expected price paid by informed and captive consumers move in opposite directions
with respect to n. It is also useful to note that this can be written as
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The expected minimum price is
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Substituting these into the right-hand side of [*] gives:
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The function h( ) is sketched below for l = 1/2 , n = 2:
In fact, for all l, n, the function h( ) has a similar shape: decreasing from h(p0) > 0 to a local
minimum at p = 1 - l, where h(1 - l) > 0, then increasing to a local maximum at p = (1  -
l)/(1  - l + n l exp{1/n - n}), then decreasing toward a limiting value of 0 as p approaches
1. In particular we will show that h( ) is non-negative, and thus
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The first and last terms are positive and negative respectively. The other two terms are both
decreasing in p. For small p both middle terms are positive, and so h( ) is decreasing. For
large p both middle terms are negative, and so h( ) is decreasing. In an intermediate range,
1 - l < p < (1 - l)/(1 - l + n l exp{1/n - n}), the middle terms have opposite signs, and so
h( ) is increasing. (The bounds are determined by the turning points where each of the middle
terms evaluates to zero.) At p = 1 - l, h( ) has a local minimum and attains a value of
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Derivation of coefficient of variation. The coefficient of variation is defined as:
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The coefficients of variation given in the text are calculated from this expression using the
values given in Table 1.39
Appendix B. Pilot Sessions
Two pilot sessions were conducted using the same procedures as described in the text, except
(1) subjects were mainly Ph.D. students, and (2) subjects completed a quiz to test whether
they understood the instructions. All subjects completed this quiz correctly, and our view was
that it merely lengthened the session: one of the pilot sessions exceeded ninety minutes.
Rather than reduce the number of decision-making periods, we decided to eliminate the quiz
for the twelve sessions reported in the text. The results from the pilot experiment are
displayed below in Figures B1-B6, which were constructed in the same way as Figures 3-8.
Figure B1. Average Prices (Pilot Data)
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Figure B2. Average Minimum Prices (Pilot Data)
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Figure B3. Theoretical and Empirical Cumulative Distributions
2 Sellers - Phases 1 and 3 (Pilot Data)
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Figure B4. Theoretical and Empirical Cumulative Distributions
2 Sellers - Phase 2 (Pilot Data)
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Figure B5. Theoretical and Empirical Cumulative Distributions
4 Sellers - Phases 1 and 3 (Pilot Data)
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Figure B6. Theoretical and Empirical Cumulative Distributions
4 Sellers - Phase 2 (Pilot Data)
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Appendix C. Instructions
General rules
This session is part of an experiment in the economics of decision making. If you follow the
instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn a considerable amount of
money. At the end of the session you will be paid, in private and in cash, a £3 participation
fee plus an additional amount that will depend on your decisions.
There are twelve people in this room who are participating in this session. It is important that
you do not talk to any of the other people in the room until the session is over.
The session will consist of 90 periods, in each of which you can earn points. At the end of the
experiment you will be paid £3 plus an additional amount based on your total point earnings
from all 90 periods. Points will be converted to cash using an exchange rate of 100 points =
1p. Notice that the more points you earn, the more cash you will receive at the end of the
session.
Description of a period
Each person in the room has been designated as a seller. In each period you will be
competing with {one}[three] other seller[s], randomly selected from the people in this room.
Your point earnings will depend on your decision and your competitor{'s}[s'] decision.
Because sellers are randomly matched at the beginning of each period, the identity of your
competitor[s] will change from period to period.
In every period, each seller decides what price to charge. You make your decision by entering
a price (any whole number between 0 and 100) on your terminal. After all sellers have made
their decisions, the computer will calculate the number of units sold by each seller as follows.
You and your competitor[s] will be selling to six computerized buyers. Each buyer will buy
twelve units. Some of these buyers have been programmed to 'search': this type of buyer will
buy twelve units from whoever chooses the lowest price out of you and your competitor[s].
(If there is a tie for the lowest price, the twelve units are evenly divided between {you and
your competitor}[the tied competitors].) The rest of the computerized buyers have been
programmed to 'not search': this type of buyer will buy {six}[three] units each from you and
your competitor[s]. At the beginning of each period the number of buyers of each type will be
displayed on your terminal.
Your point earnings from the period will be equal to the price you charge times the number of
units you sell.
At the end of each period the prices charged by each seller will be displayed on your
terminal, from lowest to highest. (You will be informed of the prices of all sellers in the
session, not just the price[s] of your competitor[s] in that period. The rows corresponding to
you and your competitor[s] will be highlighted.) Next to each price, the number of units sold
by that seller will also be displayed. Your terminal will also display your point earnings for
that period, your point earnings from the last five periods, and your accumulated point
earnings from all periods.43
Differences between periods
All periods are identical except that your competitor[s] will be changing from period to
period, and the number of each type of buyer will be changing from phase to phase.
In Phase One, consisting of periods 1 to 30, there will be three computerized buyers
programmed to search and three computerized buyers programmed to not search.
In Phase Two, consisting of periods 31 to 60, there will be five computerized buyers
programmed to search and one computerized buyer programmed to not search. Otherwise,
Phase Two is identical to Phase One.
In Phase Three, consisting of periods 61 to 90, there will be three computerized buyers
programmed to search and three computerized buyers programmed to not search. That is,
Phase Three is identical to Phase One.
Starting the experiment
We are now ready to begin the decision-making part of the session. Press the “start” button
and follow the prompts on the screens. If you have any questions during the rest of the
session raise your hand and a monitor will come to your desk and answer them in private.